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Abstract  This  article  argues  that  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  not  valid  or  useful.  The  use  of
psychiatric  diagnosis  increases  stigma,  does  not  aid  treatment  decisions,  is  associated  with
worsening long-term  prognosis  for  mental  health  problems,  and  imposes  Western  beliefs  about
mental distress  on  other  cultures.  This  article  reviews  the  evidence  base  focusing  in  particular
on empirical  ﬁndings  in  relation  to  the  topics  of:  aetiology,  validity,  reliability,  treatment  and
outcome,  prognosis,  colonialism,  and  cultural  and  public  policy  impact.  This  evidence  points
toward diagnostic  based  frameworks  for  understanding  and  intervening  in  mental  health  difﬁ-
culties being  unable  to  either  improve  our  scientiﬁc  knowledge  or  improve  outcomes  in  clinical
practice and  suggests  that  we  need  to  move  away  from  reliance  on  diagnostic  based  approaches
for organising  research  and  service  delivery.  Alternative  evidence-based  models  for  organising
effective mental  health  care  are  available.  Therefore  formal  psychiatric  diagnostic  systems
such as  the  mental  health  section  of  the  International  Classiﬁcation  of  Diseases  Tenth  Edition
(ICD-10) and  Diagnostic  Statistical  Manual  Fifth  Edition  (DSM  5)  should  be  abolished.
© 2014  Asociación  Espan˜ola  de  Psicología  Conductual.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.  All
rights reserved.
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No  más  etiquetas  psiquiátricas:  por  qué  deberían  suprimirse  los  sistemas  formales  de
diagnóstico  psiquiátrico
Resumen  Este  artículo  plantea  que  los  diagnósticos  psiquiátricos  no  son  válidos  ni  útiles.ICD;
Críticas;
Estudio  teórico
El uso  del  diagnóstico  psiquiátrico  aumenta  el  estigma,  no  ayuda  a  las  decisiones  sobre  el
tratamiento,  se  asocia  con  un  empeoramiento  en  el  pronóstico  a  largo  plazo  de  los  problemas
de salud  mental  e  impone  creencias  occidentales  sobre  la  angustia  mental  en  otras  culturas.
Se analiza  la  evidencia  disponible  acerca  de  hallazgos  empíricos  relacionados  con  la  etiología,
validez, ﬁabilidad,  tratamiento  y  resultados,  el  pronóstico,  el  colonialismo  y  el  impacto  de
la política  cultural  y  pública.  Esta  evidencia  apunta  hacia  diagnósticos  basados  en  contextos
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de  comprensión  e  intervención  en  los  problemas  de  salud  mental  incapaces  de  mejorar  el
conocimiento  cientíﬁco  o  los  resultados  en  la  práctica  clínica,  sugiriéndose  un  alejamiento  de
la dependencia  de  los  enfoques  basados  en  diagnósticos  para  la  organización  de  la  investigación
y la  prestación  de  servicios.  Están  disponibles  modelos  alternativos  basados  en  la  evidencia  para
la organización  efectiva  de  la  atención  en  salud  mental.  Por  lo  tanto,  los  sistemas  de  diagnóstico
psiquiátrico  formales,  como  la  décima  edición  de  la  Clasiﬁcación  Internacional  de  Enfermedades
(CIE-10) y  la  quinta  edición  del  Manual  Diagnóstico  Estadístico  (DSM  5)  deben  ser  abolidos.
© 2014  Asociación  Espan˜ola  de  Psicología  Conductual.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  España,  S.L.  Todos
los derechos  reservados.
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gModern  Western  psychiatry  has  secured  many  important
advances  in  the  care  of  people  with  mental  distress  (Obiols,
2012;  Reed,  Anaya  &  Evans,  2012).  We  have  a  variety  of
pharmacotherapies  and  psychotherapies  that  can  help  man-
age  and  understand  distressing  symptoms  and  ﬁnd  new  ways
to  deal  with  them.  The  old  asylums  have  been  emptied  and
community  care  has  developed  a  variety  of  services  from
early  intervention  to  crisis  management.  The  academic  com-
munity,  studying  mental  distress  from  a  variety  of  angles,
has  grown  in  numbers  and  sophistication,  with  many  jour-
nals  and  thousands  of  articles  published  each  year.  These
are  worthy  achievements,  and  this  progress  has  no  doubt
helped  thousands  of  people  across  the  world.
Despite  these  achievements,  psychiatric  theory  and
practice  is  at  an  impasse.  Prevention  has  proved  elusive,
with  mental  health  diagnoses  becoming  more  not  less  com-
mon.  The  diagnoses  listed  in  the  major  psychiatric  diagnostic
manuals  have  not  yet  been  linked  with  any  sort  of  physical
test  or  other  biological  marker  (apart  from  the  dementias)
and  so,  unlike  the  rest  of  medicine,  psychiatric  diagnoses  do
not  have  pathophysiological  correlates  and  no  independent
data  is  available  to  the  diagnostician  to  support  their  sub-
jective  assessment  of  diagnosis.  Whilst  reliability  in  making
diagnoses  has  improved  for  some  research  purposes,  this  has
not  translated  to  clinical  practice  and  the  more  important
issue  of  validity  remains  poorly  addressed.  Tellingly,  there
is  little  evidence  to  show  that  using  psychiatric  diagnostic
categories  as  a  guide  for  treatment  signiﬁcantly  impacts  on
outcomes.
This  article  highlights  the  extent  to  which  empirical  data
is  inconsistent  with  the  diagnostic-based  medical  model
remaining  as  the  organising  paradigm  for  practice.  The
important  task  of  sketching  out  what  services  may  look  like
once  we  discard  systems  such  as  ICD  and  DSM  from  routine
clinical  practice  is  not  the  primary  purpose  of  this  article
and  therefore  will  only  be  afforded  a  brief  mention  and  not
covered  in  any  depth.
Aetiology
The  failure  of  decades  of  basic  science  research  to  reveal
any  speciﬁc  biological  or  psychological  marker  that  identi-
ﬁes  a  psychiatric  diagnosis  is  well  recognised.  Unlike  the  rest
of  medicine,  which  has  developed  diagnostic  systems  that
build  on  an  aetiological  and  pathophysiological  framework,
psychiatric  diagnostic  manuals  such  as  DSM  5  (American
Psychiatric  Association,  APA,  2013)  and  ICD-10  (World  Health
Organization,  WHO,  1994)  have  failed  to  connect  diagnostic
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lategories  with  aetiological  processes.  Thus,  there  are  no
hysical  tests  referred  to  in  either  manual  that  can  be  used
o  help  establish  a  diagnosis.  This  lack  of  scientiﬁc  progress
onnected  to  diagnostic  groupings  is  a  problem  for  research
rom  a  variety  of  perspectives,  including  biological  research,
here  leading  research  groups  are  abandoning  the  use  of
urrent  diagnostic  constructs  (Marneros  &  Akiskal,  2007;
wen,  O’Donovan,  Thapar,  &  Craddock,  2011).  Despite  the
elief  that  psychiatric  disorders  have  a  clear  genetic  load-
ng,  molecular  genetic  research  is  failing  to  uncover  any  spe-
iﬁc  genetic  proﬁle  for  any  disorder.  Possible  genetic  abnor-
alities  appears  to  account  for  only  a  small  percentage  of
ausal  factors,  and  whatever  genetic  contribution  has  been
ound  crosses  diagnostic  categories  rather  than  having  a
istinct  proﬁle  for  each  diagnostic  category  (Cross-Disorder
roup  of  the  Psychiatric  Genomics  Consortium,  2013).
The  one  notable  exception  to  the  lack  of  aetiological
rganisation  in  diagnostic  systems  is  ‘post  traumatic  stress
isorder’  (PTSD),  which  implies  that  trauma  leads  to  a  par-
icular  and  identiﬁable  constellation  of  symptoms.  However,
here  is  a  substantial  body  of  evidence  which  ﬁnds  that  in
he  full  spectrum  of  diagnoses  in  psychiatry,  including  psy-
hosis,  there  is  a  greater  likelihood  of  experiencing  trauma
nd  abuse  (Bebbington  et  al.,  2004;  Escher,  Romme,  Buiks,
elespaul,  &  van  Os,  2002;  Goodman,  Rosenberg,  &  Mueser,
997;  Greenﬁeld,  Strakowski,  Tohen,  Batson,  &  Kolbrener,
994;  Honig,  Romme,  Ensink,  Pennings,  &  de  Vries,  1998;
orrison,  Frame,  &  Larkin,  2003;  Mueser  et  al.,  1998;  Read,
gar,  Argyle,  &  Aderhold,  2003;  Varese  et  al.,  2012).
alidity
f  we  were  to  apply  the  standards  found  in  the  rest
f  medicine,  then  the  validity  of  a  diagnostic  construct
epends  on  the  extent  to  which  it  represents  a  naturally
ccurring  category.  If  it  can  ‘carve  nature  at  its  joints’,  then
here  should  be  some  identiﬁable  properties  beyond  symp-
oms  or  behaviours,  in  those  who  have  the  diagnosis  that  can
istinguish  them  from  those  who  don’t.  The  failure  of  basic
cience  research  to  reveal  any  speciﬁc  biological  marker  for
sychiatric  diagnoses  means  that  current  psychiatric  diag-
ostic  systems  do  not  share  the  same  scientiﬁc  security,  of
elonging  to  a  technological  model  developed  by  research
rounded  in  the  natural  sciences,  as  the  rest  of  medicine.
he  attempted  solution  of  continuing  to  spend  the  bulk  of
ental  health  research  time  and  effort  trying  to  correct
his  deﬁcit  by  relentlessly  searching  for  evidence  of  bio-
ogical  correlates  continues  to  deliver  nothing  scientiﬁcally
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r  clinically  useful.  Our  failure  to  ﬁnd  biological  correlates
hould  not  necessarily  be  seen  as  weakness.  Instead,  we
hould  view  this  failure  as  an  opportunity  to  review  the  dom-
nant  paradigm  in  order  to  develop  one  that  better  ﬁts  the
vidence.
The  frequency  with  which  patients  are  given  more  than
ne  diagnosis  raises  a  concern  about  the  speciﬁcity  of  diag-
ostic  categories.  Widespread  co-morbidity  (making  more
han  one  diagnosis  in  order  to  encompass  patients’  prob-
ems)  indicates  basic  deﬁciencies  in  our  understanding  of  the
atural  boundaries  of  even  the  most  severe  conditions  we
re  diagnosing  (Anckarsäter,  2010;  Middleton,  2008;  Van  Os,
003a,b).  It  is  also  common  to  ﬁnd  the  ‘dominant’  diagnosis
hanging  in  any  individual,  almost  exclusively  on  a  subjec-
ive  rather  than  empirical  (such  as  physical  test  results)
asis.
Unlike  in  the  rest  of  medicine,  where  the  reason  for  the
atient’s  symptoms  is  clariﬁed  by  a  diagnosis,  psychiatric
iagnoses  serve  only  as  descriptors  that  do  not  have  the
ower  of  explanation.  Thus,  when  a  clinician  claims  that
 patient  is  ‘really’  depressed,  or  has  ADHD,  or  has  bipo-
ar  disorder,  or  whatever,  not  only  are  they  trying  to  turn
omething  based  on  subjective  opinion  into  something  that
ppears  empirical,  but  they  are  engaging  with  the  process  of
eiﬁcation  (that  is,  turning  something  subjective  into  some-
hing  ‘concrete’).  The  problem  with  turning  concepts  into
omething  that  appears  as  if  it  exists  as  a  fact  in  the  natural
orld  is  that  it  can  cause  ‘tunnel  vision’  for  all  concerned;  a
ominant  story  that  limits  alternative,  more  functional  pos-
ibilities  for  any  individual.  Thus,  if  someone  believes  ADHD
s  a  ‘real’  disorder  that  exists  in  their  brains  and  is  poten-
ially  lifelong,  that  person  and  those  who  know  them  may
ome  to  act  according  to  this  belief,  thus  helping  to  fulﬁl  its
rophecy.
There  is  also  a  poor  correspondence  between  levels
f  impairment  and  having  the  required  number  of  symp-
oms  for  many  psychiatric  diagnoses.  Literature  reviews  and
eld  trials  to  examine  clinical  signiﬁcance  criteria  were  not
ncluded  in  the  preparation  of  DSM-IV.  Thus,  many  below
he  threshold  for  a  diagnosis  have  higher  levels  of  impair-
ent  than  those  above,  with  many  who  reach  the  cut  off
or  a  diagnosis  having  relatively  low  levels  of  impairment
Angold,  Costello,  Farmer,  Burns,  &  Erkanli,  1999;  Kendler,
999;  Simonoff  et  al.,  1997;  Van  Os,  2003a,b).
eliability
eliability  is  the  extent  to  which  clinicians  can  agree  on
he  same  diagnoses  when  independently  assessing  a series
f  patients.  Improving  reliability  of  psychiatric  diagnoses
as  hastened  after  critics  pointed  out  that  many  of  the
ommon  diagnoses  were  meaningless  because  of  poor  levels
f  agreement  between  psychiatrists  about  key  symptoms.
osenhan’s  (1973)  study  spurred  on  new  attempts  to  ‘stan-
ardise’  diagnostic  practice  after  he  demonstrated  that
sychiatrists  were  often  unable  to  discriminate  between
ane  and  psychotic  people.  Formal  diagnostic  systems  like
SM  and  ICD  attempted  to  address  these  problems  by  impos-
ng  diagnostic  agreement  on  the  profession  through  the  use
f  standardised  diagnostic  criteria  through  symptom  check-
ists.
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However,  analysis  of  the  studies  involved  in  develop-
ng  the  ﬁrst  diagnostic  manual  that  took  this  approach  of
operationalising’  diagnosis  through  the  checklist  of  symp-
oms  approach  (DSM-III)  found  no  diagnostic  categories  for
hich  reliability  was  uniformly  high.  Ranges  of  reliability
or  major  diagnostic  categories  were  found  to  be  broad,
nd  in  some  cases  ranged  the  entire  spectrum  from  chance
o  perfect  agreement,  with  the  case  summary  studies  (in
hich  clinicians  are  given  detailed  written  case  histories
nd  asked  to  make  diagnoses--an  approach  that  most  closely
pproximates  what  happens  in  clinical  practice)  producing
he  lowest  reliability  levels  (Kirk  &  Kutchins,  1994).  No  stud-
es  of  the  reliability  of  DSM  as  a  whole  when  used  in  natural
linical  settings  have  shown  uniformly  high  reliability,  with
any  ﬁnding  reliability  ratings  that  are  not  that  different
rom  those  in  the  pre-operationalised  criteria  studies  (Kirk
 Kutchins,  1992,  1994;  Williams  et  al.,  1992).  In  DSM  5  ﬁeld
rials  (Freedman  et  al.,  2013),  the  kappa  coefﬁcients  (a  sta-
istical  measure  of  inter-rater  agreement),  were  uniformly
oor  with  some  common  diagnoses  such  as  Major  Depressive
isorder  and  Generalized  Anxiety  Disorder  achieving  having
evels  of  inter-rater  agreement  little  better  than  chance.
reatment and outcome
he  technological  paradigm  that  dominates  is  predicated  on
he  assumption  that  the  technical  aspects  of  medical  and
sychological  care  are  of  primary  importance,  and  that  mak-
ng  diagnoses  allows  rational  choice  of  the  correct  technical
ntervention.
However,  the  evidence  ﬁnds  that  ‘common  factors’,  such
s  developing  a  strong  therapeutic  alliance,  are  much  more
mportant  than  therapeutic  technique  in  determining  out-
omes  (Duncan,  Miller,  Wampold,  &  Hubble,  2009;  Wampold,
001).  For  example,  studies  have  shown  that  most  of  the
peciﬁc  features  of  Cognitive  Behaviour  Therapy  (CBT)  can
e  dispensed  with,  without  adversely  affecting  outcomes
Jacobson  et  al.,  1996;  Longmore  &  Worrell,  2007).
Meta-analyses  have  concluded  that  the  majority  of  vari-
nce  in  outcome  as  a  result  of  therapy  is  accounted  for  by
xtra-therapeutic  factors,  whilst  the  quality  of  the  ther-
peutic  alliance  accounts  for  most  of  the  within-therapy
ariance  in  treatment  outcome,  and  is  up  to  seven  times
ore  inﬂuential  in  promoting  change  than  treatment  model
sed  (Duncan,  Miller,  &  Sparks,  2004;  Wampold,  2001).
his  is  also  evident  in  ‘real  life’  clinical  encounters.  For
xample,  in  a  review  of  over  5,000  cases  treated  in  a  vari-
ty  of  National  Health  Service  settings  in  the  UK,  only  a
ery  small  proportion  of  the  variance  in  outcome  could
e  attributed  to  psychotherapeutic  technique,  as  opposed
o  non-speciﬁc  effects  such  as  the  therapeutic  relationship
Stiles,  Barkham,  &  Mellor-Car,  2008).
The  importance  of  non-speciﬁc  factors  is  also  found  when
sing  psychoactive  drug  treatments.  The  evidence  supports
he  view  that  pharmacological  agents  are  best  conceptu-
lised  as  inducing  particular  psychological  states  (rather
han  correcting  chemical  imbalances)  that  is  not  speciﬁcally
elated  to  diagnosis,  but  is  nonetheless  the  basis  for  their
sefulness  (Moncrieff,  2009).  This  reﬂects  clinical  practice
here  the  few  categories  of  psychoactive  medications  used
n  psychiatry  are  used  in  a  non-diagnosis  speciﬁc  way.  For
xample,  Selective  Serotonin  Reuptake  Inhibitors  (SSRI)  are
ic  sy
a
t
w
1
c
t
b
a
n
t
y
o
5
n
b
m
w
o
d
i
o
a
w
i
b
n
i
t
o
(
c
a
b
f
e
h
(
a
c
a
t
o
H
&
d
d
s
(
2
s
a
a
i
sNo  more  psychiatric  labels:  Why  formal  psychiatric  diagnost
claimed  to  be  efﬁcacious  in  conditions  as  disparate  as  bor-
derline  personality  disorder,  depression,  generalised  anxiety
disorder,  obsessive  compulsive  disorder,  anorexia  nervosa,
bulimia,  panic  disorder,  social  phobias  and  so  forth.  As  a  psy-
choactive  substance,  SSRIs  would  appear  to  do  ‘something’
to  the  mental  state,  but  that  something  is  not  diagnosis
speciﬁc.  Like  alcohol,  which  will  produce  inebriation  in  a
person  with  schizophrenia,  obsessive  compulsive  disorder,
depression  or  someone  with  no  psychiatric  diagnosis,  SSRIs
will  also  impact  individuals  in  ways  that  are  not  speciﬁc
to  diagnosis.  Similarly,  major  tranquilisers  (misnamed  ‘anti-
psychotics’)  have  also  been  advocated  for  the  treatment
of  depression,  anxiety  disorders,  bipolar  affective  disorder,
personality  disorders,  as  well  as  schizophrenia--a  list  that
contains  considerable  overlap  with  that  found  for  SSRIs.
The  therapeutics  of  many  psychiatric  drug  treatments
also  relies  more  on  non-speciﬁc  factors  than  disease-speciﬁc
therapeutic  effects.  For  example,  it  is  generally  assumed
that  drugs  marketed  as  ‘antidepressants’  work  through  their
pharmacological  effects  on  speciﬁc  neurotransmitters  in
the  Central  Nervous  System,  reversing  particular  states
of  ‘chemical  imbalance’.  However,  the  evidence  points
to  placebo  effects  being  more  important  than  any  neuro-
pharmacological  ones.  Thus,  several  meta-analyses  have
concluded  that  most  of  the  beneﬁts  from  ‘antidepressants’
can  be  explained  by  the  placebo  effect,  with  only  a  small
amount  of  the  variance  (and  for  most  a  clinically  insigniﬁ-
cant  amount),  attributable  to  the  drug  (Kirsch  et  al.,  2008;
Turner  &  Rosenthal,  2008).  Thus,  having  a  good  relation-
ship  with  the  prescribing  doctor  is  a  stronger  predictor  of
a  positive  response  to  an  ‘anti-depressant’  than  just  taking
the  drug  regardless  of  who  prescribes  it  (Sparks,  Duncan,  &
Miller,  2008).
The  lack  of  treatment  speciﬁcity  is  not  limited  to  the
more  common  and  less  severe  presentations.  Although  drugs
marketed  as  ‘antipsychotic’  are  often  claimed  to  reverse  a
biochemical  imbalance  in  psychotic  patients,  no  such  imbal-
ance  has  been  demonstrated.  Furthermore,  academics  have
long  been  aware  of  a  perplexing  ﬁnding.  Research  carried
out  by  the  World  Health  Organisation  (WHO)  over  the  course
of  30  years  and  starting  in  the  early  1970s,  found  that
patients  outside  the  United  States  and  Europe  have  much
lower  relapse  rates,  and  are  signiﬁcantly  more  likely  to  have
made  a  ‘full’  recovery  and  show  lower  degrees  of  impair-
ment  when  followed  up  over  several  years,  despite  most
having  limited  or  no  access  to  ‘anti-psychotic’  medication
(Hopper,  Harrison,  Janka,  &  Sartorius,  2007).  It  seems  that
the  regions  of  the  world  with  the  most  resources  to  devote  to
mental  illness--the  best  technology,  medicines,  and  the  best-
ﬁnanced  academic  and  private-research  institutions--had
the  most  troubled  and  socially  marginalised  patients.
Furthermore,  meta-analyses  of  RCTs  investigating  the  effec-
tiveness  of  ﬁrst  and  second  generation  neuroleptic  drugs
have  found  that,  at  best,  the  improvements  seen  are  dis-
appointingly  limited  (Bola,  Kao,  &  Soydan,  2012;  Lepping,
Sambhi,  Whittington,  Lane,  &  Poole,  2011).
PrognosisUnlike  the  rest  of  medicine,  no  overall  improvement  in
prognosis  has  been  demonstrated  in  Europe  and  North
America  over  the  past  century  for  those  diagnosed  with
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 mental  disorder.  Some  studies  indicate  the  opposite  -
hat  compared  to  the  past,  there  are  now  more  patients
ho  have  developed  chronic  conditions.  For  example,  in
955,  there  were  around  350,000  adults  in  the  US  state  and
ounty  mental  hospitals  with  a psychiatric  diagnosis.  During
he  next  three  decades  when  community  based  psychiatry
ecame  more  prevalent,  the  number  categorised  as  dis-
bled  from  mental  illness  rose  to  1.25  million.  By  2007  the
umber  of  people  categorised  as  disabled  mentally  ill  grew
o  more  than  4  million  adults.  Similarly,  the  numbers  of
outh  in  America  categorised  as  having  a  disability  because
f  a  mental  condition  leapt  from  around  16,000  in  1987  to
60,000  in  2007  (Whitaker,  2010).  A  similar  dramatic  rise  in
umbers  on  disability  support  due  to  a  mental  illness,  has
een  seen  in  the  UK  (Timimi,  2014).  If  the  current  national
odels  of  mental  health  service  delivery  were  effective,  we
ould  not  see  this  evidence  of  steadily  worsening  long  term
utcomes  in  parallel  with  steadily  increasing  expenditure.
As  mentioned,  long-term  outcomes  for  serious  mental
isorders  are  worse  in  more  industrialised  than  develop-
ng  countries.  The  World  Health  Organisation’s  international
utcome  in  schizophrenia  studies  found  that  after  two  years,
bout  two  thirds  of  the  patients  in  less  developed  countries
ere  doing  well  compared  to  only  a  third  of  the  patients
n  the  developed  countries.  The  researchers  concluded  that
eing  in  a  developed  country  was  the  strongest  predictor  of
ot  attaining  complete  remission  (Jablensky,  1992).
One  problem  with  medical-model  diagnostic  approaches
s  that  many  of  the  diagnoses  are  conceived  as  conditions
hat  are  genetic  and  lifelong  in  nature,  where  the  best
ne  can  hope  for  is  gaining  some  control  over  symptoms
through,  for  example,  use  of  medications).  As  such,  psy-
hiatric  diagnoses  can  foreclose  meaning  by  transforming
 range  of  experiences,  and  possible  meanings  that  can
e  applied  to  these  experiences,  into  a  narrow  disease
ramework,  limiting  the  cultural  imagination  to  particular
xpectations.
Prognosis  for  those  with  mental  disorders  is  also  further
ampered  by  the  stigma  associated  with  the  medical  model
Sayce,  2000).  Nearly  all  studies  that  have  looked  at  public
ttitudes  towards  mental  illness  have  found  that  the  medi-
al  model  for  mental  illness  (mental  illness  is  an  illness  like
ny  other  illness)  is  associated  with  increased  negative  atti-
udes,  greater  fear  of  patients,  and  a  greater  likelihood
f  wanting  to  avoid  interacting  with  them  (Angermeyer,
olzinger,  Carta,  &  Schomerus,  2011;  Read,  Haslam,  Sayce,
 Davies,  2006).
Similar  ﬁndings  emerge  in  personal  stories  of  those
iagnosed  with  a  ‘mental  illness’.  Many  of  these  stories
escribe  how  some  users  of  mental  health  services  felt
tigmatised  and  marginalised  by  a  psychiatric  diagnosis
Romme,  Escher,  Dillon,  Corstens,  &  Morris,  2009;  Sayce,
000).  Being  labelled  with  a  chronic  ‘genetic’  condition
uch  as  ‘schizophrenia’  interferes  with  a  person’s  identity
nd  biography.  Indeed,  the  presence  of  ‘insight’  (meaning
ccepting  you  are  mentally  ill  and  need  medical  treatment)
n  schizophrenia  has  been  found  to  be  associated  with  lower
elf-esteem,  despair,  and  hopelessness  (Bassman,  2000)  and
s  negatively  correlated  with  emotional  well-being,  eco-
omic  satisfaction,  and  vocational  status  (Hasson-Ohanon,
ravetz,  Roe,  David,  &  Weiser,  2006;  Leff  &  Warner,  2006;
arner,  2010).  Thus,  accepting  the  medical-model  attitude
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o  diagnosis  can  bring  expectations  of  a  gloomy  outlook  with
ifelong  dependency  on  psychiatric  treatment  and  reduced
hances  of  a  good  recovery.  For  some,  therefore,  rejecting
he  diagnosis  may  be  understood  as  a  positive  way  of  coping
ith  the  implications  of  the  diagnosis  for  personal  identity.
olonialism
or  the  last  few  decades,  Western  mental-health  institutions
ave  been  pushing  the  idea  of  ‘mental-health  literacy’  on
he  rest  of  the  world.  A  new  global  campaign  for  greater
recognition’  of  mental  illnesses  in  the  non-industrialised
orld  has  developed,  which  assumes  that  ICD/DSM  descrip-
ions  are  universally  applicable  categories  (World  Health
rganisation  [WHO],  2010).  Cultures  are  viewed  as  becom-
ng  more  ‘literate’  about  mental  illness  the  more  they  adopt
estern  biomedical  conceptions  of  diagnoses  like  depression
nd  schizophrenia.  In  the  process  of  doing  this  we  not  only
mply  that  those  cultures  that  are  slow  to  take  up  these  ideas
re  in  some  way  ‘backward’,  but  we  also  export  disease  cat-
gories  and  ways  of  thinking  about  mental  distress  that  were
reviously  uncommon  in  many  parts  of  the  world.  Thus,  con-
itions  like  depression,  post-traumatic  stress  disorder,  and
norexia  appear  to  be  spreading  across  cultures,  replacing
ndigenous  ways  of  viewing  and  experiencing  mental  dis-
ress  and  opening  up  lucrative  new  markets  for  Western  drug
ompanies  (Summerﬁeld,  2008;  Watters,  2009).
The  idea  of  the  individual  as  the  locus  of  the  self  is
 relatively  recent  Western  invention  and  such  a  frame-
ork  creates  the  psychological  pre-conditions  necessary  for
ccepting  the  ‘atomised’  social  worlds  that  have  been  cre-
ted.  Yet  mental  wellbeing  seems  closely  connected  to
ocial  and  economic  factors.  Several  international  studies
ave  concluded  that  the  greater  the  inequality  (in  economic
nd  social  resources)  in  any  society,  the  poorer  is  the  mental
ealth  of  that  society  (Friedli,  2009;  James,  2007;  Pickett,
ames,  &  Wilkinson,  2006;  Pickett  &  Wilkinson,  2010).
A  subtler  source  of  impact  on  cultural  beliefs  is  due
o  psychiatric  diagnoses  inadvertently  setting  standards  for
normality’,  by  categorising  what  emotional  and  behavioural
raits  and  experiences  should  be  considered  ‘disordered’.
s  the  criteria  for  diagnoses  are  arrived  at  by  subjective
udgments  rather  than  objective  evidence  (being  literally
oted  in  or  out  of  existence  by  committees),  they  will  have
n  automatic  bias  toward  the  cultural  standards  found  in
conomically  dominant  societies  (who  also  tend  to  control
hat  counts  as  ‘knowledge’  globally).  This  sets  in  motion  a
iagnostic  system  vulnerable  to  institutional  racism  in  the
ominant  societies  and  colonialism  in  others,  as  other  stan-
ards  of  normality  will,  at  least  to  some  extent,  come  to  be
iewed  as  ‘primitive’,  ‘superstitious’  etc.,  and  their  popu-
ations  will  be  viewed  as  needing  to  be  (psycho)educated
Timimi,  2012).  As  a  result,  then,  for  the  majority  of  the
orld,  all  manner  of  complex  somatic/emotional  complaints
ave  to  be  re-categorised,  spiritual  explanations  have  to  be
enounced,  parenting  practices  viewed  as  oppressive,  and
o  on.Thus  imposing  Western  medical-model  DSM/ICD-style
sychiatry  on  non-Western  populations,  risks:  the  under-
ining  of  existing  cultural  strategies  for  dealing  with
istress,  more  not  less  stigma,  and  the  imposition  of  an
p
i
i
mS.  Timimi
ndividualistic  approach  that  may  marginalise  family  and
ommunity  resources,  and  diverting  attention  from  social
njustice.
ultural and public policy impact
iagnostic  thinking  has  had  a  signiﬁcant  impact  on  service
rovision  and  public  and  professional  beliefs  about  mental
istress.  As  a  result  of  popularising  the  diagnostic  systems,
t  is  widely  argued  that  a  signiﬁcant  proportion  of  the  pop-
lation  suffers  from  mental  illness,  that  this  amounts  to
 signiﬁcant  economic  burden,  and  that  there  is  a  strong
ase  for  investing  in  improved  mechanisms  of  detection  and
reatment  for  these  disorders.  Across  several  surveys  in  the
ndustrialised  nations,  only  about  a  third  of  those  identiﬁed
s  suffering  a  mental-health  problem  (according  to  DSM/ICD
riteria)  sought,  or  were  interested  in  seeking,  professional
elp  (Andrews,  Issakidis,  &  Carter,  2001;  Kessler,  McGonagle,
 Zhao,  1994).  This  has  been  interpreted  as  unsatisfactory
ase  detection,  provision  and  treatment,  due  to  public  and
rofessional  ignorance.  However,  there  is  little  evidence
o  support  the  idea  that  popularising  mental  health  diag-
oses,  convincing  professionals  and  the  public  about  the  high
revalence  of  mental  disorders,  and  convincing  policy  mak-
rs  of  the  need  to  diagnose  and  treat  more  people,  beneﬁts
he  mental  health  of  the  society.
In  order  to  increase  rates  of  diagnosis  and  treatment,  a
ariety  of  campaigns  have  been  undertaken.  For  example,  in
he  UK  the  Royal  College  of  Psychiatrists  and  Royal  College
f  General  Practitioners  launched  their  ‘Defeat  Depres-
ion’  campaign  in  the  early  1990s  (Paykel  &  Priest,  1992).
t  was  intended  to  raise  public  awareness  of  depression,
educe  stigma,  train  general  practitioners  in  recognition  and
reatment,  and  make  specialist  advice  and  support  more
eadily  available.  Evaluations  of  this  campaign  found  no
vidence  that  it  led  to  any  signiﬁcant  improvements  in  clin-
cal  outcomes,  but  was  associated  with  a rapid  increase  in
ntidepressant  prescribing  (Croudace,  Evans,  &  Harrison,
003;  King,  Davidson,  &  Taylor,  2002;  Thompson,  Kinmonth,
 Stevens,  2000).
Similarly  research  evaluating  the  ‘Beyond  Blue’  campaign
n  Australia,  which  aims  to  increase  awareness  about  depres-
ion,  demonstrated  an  increase  in  medical  model  beliefs
bout  depression  and  an  increase  in  rates  of  diagnosis  of
ajor  depression  between  1998  and  2008.  It  also  noted  a
ecrease  in  mental  health  related  quality  of  life  over  this
ecade,  and  that  having  mental  health  literacy  (i.e.,  a  belief
hat  depression  was  a  medical  diagnosis  requiring  medical
reatment)  that  was  categorised  as  poor  or  fair,  was  a  sig-
iﬁcant  protective  for  major  depression  (Goldney,  Eckert,
awthorn,  &  Taylor,  2010).
Unlike  other  areas  of  public  health,  mental  health  in
hose  societies  with  the  most  developed  services  appears  to
e  the  poorest.  In  such  societies,  ‘epidemics’  of  psychiatric
iagnoses  (e.g.,  Attention  Deﬁcit  Hyperactivity  Disorder,
utism,  depression,  bipolar  disorder)  have  only  emerged  and
ecome  popularised  in  recent  years.  Whilst  there  are  com-
lex  political,  social  and  cultural  reasons  for  this,  they  are
n  part  due  to  popularisation  of  diagnoses  and  its  subsequent
nﬂuence  on  beliefs  about  the  nature  of  personhood  and  the
eanings  attached  to  states  of  distress.
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Conclusion
For  a  diagnostic  system  to  establish  itself  as  scientiﬁcally
useful,  its  categories  should  be  able  to  ‘carve  nature  at  its
joints’.  For  a  diagnostic  system  to  establish  itself  as  clini-
cally  useful  it  should  show  that  use  of  diagnostic  labels  aids
treatment  decisions  in  a  way  that  impacts  on  outcomes.  As
reviewed  above  there  is  little  evidence  to  support  either
position.  There  is  much  evidence  to  suggest  that  instead,
they  can  cause  signiﬁcant  harm.  The  only  evidence-based
conclusion  therefore  is  that  formal  psychiatric  diagnostic
systems  like  ICD  and  DSM  should  be  abolished.
We  can  and  should  do  better.  We  have  all  the  evidence
we  need  to  work  on  re-organising  our  approaches  locally,
nationally,  and  internationally  to  develop  services  that  use
evidence-based  paradigms  and  can  reduce  the  amount  of
harm  DSM/ICD  has  caused,  at  the  same  time  as  improving
outcomes.  Paradigms  that  draw  on  the  existing  evidence  for
what  improves  outcomes  and  that  incorporates  the  views  of
those  who  matter  most--service  users--can  easily  be  devel-
oped  and  implemented.  The  message  from  this  research  is
that  services  can  improve  outcomes  by  concentrating  on
developing  meaningful  relationships  with  service  users  that
fully  include  them  in  decision-making  processes  (Bracken
et  al.,  2012)  and  that  incorporate  service  user  feedback  to
help  with  delivering  ﬂexible  treatment  models  where  there
is  regular  testing  of  whether  or  not  a  particular  intervention
is  improving  outcomes  for  that  service  user  (Duncan,  2012;
Timimi,  Tetley,  Burgoine,  &  Walker,  2013).  International
service  user-led  movements,  such  as  the  ‘recovery’  move-
ment,  that  focus  on  the  inclusion  of  people  in  recovery  from
mental-health  problems  as  collaborators  in  research,  service
development  and  treatment  model  development,  provide
good  examples  of  how  this  evidence  can  be  developed  to
change  institutional  culture  (New  Freedom  Commission  on
Mental  Health,  2003;  Shepherd,  Boardman,  &  Burns,  2008).
The  real  gift  of  psychiatry  to  medicine  is  an  understand-
ing  of  the  person  in  their  context  leading  to  an  integrated
whole-person  model  of  healthcare.  Psychiatry  has  to  sit  at
the  conﬂuence  of  a  variety  of  disciplinary  discourses  (soci-
ology,  anthropology,  psychology,  philosophy,  biology,  politics
etc.),  and  it  is  this  broader  understanding  of  the  person  and
their  wellbeing  that  psychiatry  brings.  By  importing  the  diag-
nostic  model  from  general  medicine,  we  end  up  miss-selling
and  under-utilising  the  unique  skills  the  profession  of  psychi-
atry  brings  to  healthcare  by  the  ‘dumbing  down’  of  what  we
do  into  simplistic,  diagnosis-driven  protocols  that  have  more
to  do  with  successful  consumer  culture  marketing  than  with
science.  Changing  to  more  evidence-compatible  paradigms
is  now  long  overdue.
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